Ahstract-This paper presents a novel method for generating a secret key to augment the security of spread spectrum systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the security issues involved in the design of a wireless communication system. In particular, due to the broadcast nature of wireless cOlmnunications, a passive eaves dropper (Eve) within the range of the broadcast can obtain any of the information being communicated between legitimate parties (Alice and Bob). Conventional security methods based on [1] rely on the use of trapdoor one-way functionsfunctions that are computationally difficult to compute without a special key. These methods work under scenarios in which the adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded. However, if we remove the assumption of a computationally bounded Eve, the security of these methods is compromised.
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2) information reconciliation, 3) privacy amplification, and 4) secure cOlmnunication.
Randomness sharing is when the reciprocal channel between the legitimate parties is probed. In the information recon ciliation step, the two nodes communicate to reconcile the differences between their reciprocal channel measurements. Privacy amplification is the step wherein a secret key bit vector is generated from the reconciled information. Finally, in secure communication the parties transmit messages using the key.
These methods do not make computational assumptions on the adversary and are therefore able to allow for information theoretically secure communication between communicating parties, provided that the key is used as a one-time pad [8] , [9] . The problem with the secure communication that takes place based on this key exchange method is that the keys generated between the two nodes must agree completely to be used properly, hence, they are fault-intolerant. As a consequence of this, the information reconciliation step may need to be repeated multiple times for noisier channel estimates -slowing the throughput of the secure communications.
In contradistinction to the aforementioned PHY-Iayer key generation methods, we propose the use of "secure informa tion transmission" methods [10]- [14] . In these methods, most often the channel gains and/or phases are pre-compensated by Alice before they are transmitted to Bob, and vice-versa. In this way, AlicelBob is essentially disguising the information symbols she/he wants to transmit with the channel state information (CSI), thereby preventing Eve from decoding the symbols.
The benefit of secure information transmission methods over PHY-Iayer key generation methods is that they allow the key to be fault-tolerant (the key being the pre-compensator of the channel). If the transmitted pre-compensated channel has some mismatch between Alice and Bob due to the non reciprocities incurred by the measurements, then to a secure information transmission system, this only adds additional noise. The added noise can be compensated through coding. Additionally, these methods may skip the information recon ciliation and the privacy amplification steps required by PHY layer key generation methods.
The problem with the secure information transmission solu-tions are that they typically assume Raleigh fading models. [4] suggests that when Rician models are considered, the amount of secure information shared between legitimate parties de creases significantly. In fact, it is experimentally shown that approximately half as much information is available when comparing non-line-of-sight (NLOS) environments to line-of sight (LOS) environments. This poses a problem for secure information transmission methods because if Eve is able to obtain a CSI highly correlated to the CSI between Alice and Bob, then the transmitted information could possibly be leaked to Eve, thus compromising security. In consideration of this problem, Wallace et. al [4] proposed an augmentation to the generation of a key in Rician environments, for MIMO channels. In this method, a set of channel covariance matrices, one for each antenna pair, are formed based on Nb temporal signal samples. Next, a principal component removal (PCR) of each of these matrices, corresponding to the strongest Rician component of the respective channel, is applied. This particular method requires computational power and the use of a MIMO network. Additionally, the method also takes the statistics over a significant period of time, and the authors only advise the use of this method if a Rician channel is detected.
In this paper, we take a different approach, much simpler than PCR method. We propose to directly remove the strongest path of the channel impulse response. We refer to this approach as the strongest path cancellation (SPC). Our method can be used in a SISO setup and is applied locally at each node and independently from other nodes. The idea behind this step is that when the communicating parties are in a Rician environment as opposed to a Raleigh environment, the strongest path of the CIR corresponds to the information most shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve. By removing this path, we effectively remove the component that gives rise to the largest portion of the information shared between the three parties. Thus, Alice and Bob are left with a CIR more dissimilar to that of the Eve.
Another problem in secure wireless communication sys tems, in general, is that a simple partial or narrow band jammer can easily thwart the secure communication setup, by transmitting a narrowband jamming signal. To avoid this problem, we propose to build our secure communication based on a special form of multicarrier spread-spectrum (MC-SS) system that our group has recently developed, [15] . MC-SS has been known in the literature for some times, [16] - [18] , and been shown to be resilient to partial and narrowband interference. The MC-SS that we use is built based on a bank of mutually exclusive filters. It has been named filter bank MC-SS (FB-MC-SS) and as discussed in [15] has a close relationship with filtered multitone (FMT) modulation, [19] . In FB-MC-SS, each data symbol is spread across all the subbands through a spreading gain vector. We measure the channel impulse response between Alice and Bob and set up the spreading gain factor based on the measured impulse response. Since Eve's channel is different from Alice and Bob's, she has no access to the spreading code and thus cannot extract the information bits being communicated through FB-MC-SS between Bob and Alice.
We study various methods, including the SPC, to make sure the spreading gain vector constructed by Eve has maximum dissimilarity with those of Alice and Bob. We confirm sat isfactory operation of our method through experiments over a wide range of indoor wireless channels. We also bring up a weakness of the secure information transmission methods, in general; the fact that still there exists a possibility for Eve to estimate the channel between Bob and Alice through blind channel estimation methods, assuming a long length of data is transmitted using a key/pre-compensatory based on a single measured CSI. We propose additional measures for the proposed FB-MC-SS secure transmission to alleviate this problem.
To summarize our contributions, we propose the generation of a fault-tolerant key through SPC to decorrelate the key seen by Eve from the legitimate partys' channel measure ments. Next, we use a secure information transmission setup to transmit the generated key as a spreading code for FB MC-SS. This complete solution allows us to communicate securely even in harsh environments where a significant level of noise/interferers may make the job of setting up a fault intolerant key very difficult.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief summary of FB-MC-SS method. The proposed steps taken that we suggest to convert the measured CSI to a key for secure information transmission are listed in Section III. An adversary model is presented in Section IV and experimental results are presented in Section V. Section VI is devoted to some discussion related to the security level of the proposed approach and methods for improving it. Concluding remarks are made in Section VII.
Notations: Our presentation is a mix of continuous-time and discrete-time signals. We use x(t) when reference is made to a continuous time signal, and x[n] when referring to a discrete-time signal. In construction of complex-valued signals, the subscripts 'R' and 'I' are used to refer to the real and imaginary parts, respectively, and j = A. Also, we use �[x] and 'S[x] to refer to the real and imaginary parts of a complex variable x, respectively. Ve ctors and matrices are denoted by lowercase and uppercase bold letters. We use Il x ll to denote the 2-norm of vector x. Similarly, we use I l x( t) II to refer to the 2-norm of a continuous-time function. We use (x, y ) to denote the standard inner product of x and y.
II. FB-MC-SS METHOD
In FB-MC-SS, the transmit signal is generated as
where s[n] is the transmitted symbols, hk(t) are a set of non overlapping filters, T is symbol interval, and rk are a set of spreading gains. To keep the same signal power at inputs to the subband filters hk(t), the spreading gains are chosen as rk = eiOk, where ek are a set of random phases. Moreover, the filters hk(t) all originate from the same prototype filter h(t) and, thus, expressed as (2) where ik are the centers of the subcarrier bands. In FB-MC SS, as introduced in [15] , ik = 41f IT and h( t) is a square-root raised-cosine filter with the roll-off factor a = 1. With these choices, the set of filters hk(t) are mutually exclusive in their pass/transition bands. Moreover, the processing gain achieved in this spread spectrum system is found to be 2N, where N is the number of active bands, [15] .
At the receiver, the data symbols s[n] are recovered by linearly combining the the outputs of an analysis filter bank in which the subcarrier filters are matched to hk(t), for k = 0,1, ... ,N -1. The set of spreading gains rk are pre compensated/selected (disguised, from the point of view of Eve) through CSI measurements and secure key generation that is discussed in the following section.
III. SECURE KEY GENER ATION
In this section, we discuss the steps that Bob and Alice will go through to set up a secure key for information transmission. The first step is to measure the channel impulse response. The measured response is subsequently used for the key generation. Here, we proposed a key generation procedure whose result is a set of pseudo random phases, Bb that relates to the channel response between Bob and Alice. These random phases are used to generate the spreading gains rk = ejOk. As discussed below, we take some measures to assure that Eve cannot set up a key that has any similarity with those of Bob and Alice; even if she follows the steps that Bob and Alice take.
A. Channel Estimation
We consider the problem of estimating the baseband channel response {c( t) It E lIt.} at a set of discrete time instants equally spaced at {t = kTs IkE Z}, where Ts = Tb I L is the sampling interval, n is the symbol interval, and L is an integer greater than one.
We use a cyclic sequence, following [20] , to simplify the channel estimation. To this end, multiple repetitions of a beacon symbol sequence s[n] of length M is interpolated by L through a square-root Nyquist filter, q(t), and transmitted. These symbols are spaced at Tb interval. The received signal samples, after demodulation to baseband, are filtered with a filter matched to q(t). Ignoring the channel noise, this results in the periodic sequence y(kTs) = L s[n mod M]c(kTs -nn) (3) n with period LM. The notation "n mod M" means n modulo M.
Next, decimating a period of y(kTs) by a factor of L, we obtain L signal vectors, each of length M. We denote these vectors by Ye , f! = 0, 1, . . . ,L -1. These relate to L decimated 
Solutions to (4), for f! = 0,1,··· ,L -1, gives a set of polyphase components of the channel impulse response. Inter leaving these polyphase components, we construct a vector of length LM of the samples of the channel impulse response. We use C to denote this final estimate of the channel impulse response. This technique is advantageous in that it allows us to obtain channel estimates spaced at a high sampling interval of is = IITs which becomes useful in the implementation of SPC, as discussed below.
B. Key Generation
The channel estimation procedure described above is per formed by the legitimate parties (Bob and Alice) and is used to generate a pair of keys. Before, we give the details of how the keys are generated, we note that since Bob and Alice may not be time synchronized with one another, the pair of channel estimates generated by them very likely will not be time aligned. Additionally, there may be some fractional time shifts (smaller than Ts) between the two impulse responses associated with the obtained channel estimates, for the same reason. More specifically, the pair of channel estimates may be circularly shifted with respect to each other. To counteract these timing differences, we interpolate the estimated channel by a factor L2 and time align the interpolated impulse response by positioning its maximum to a predefined position through a circular shift. Other differences, due to channel noise and hardware differences amongst the nodes may also exist. In the rest of this section, we ignore these differences, noting that these non-reciprocities are difficult to obviate and that their impacts on the generated keys are usually negligible.
The key is generated by taking the following steps:
1) The estimated channel response vectors are interpolated by a factor L2 and then time aligned by both Bob and Alice according to the following rule. The largest sample of c is moved to the middle by circularly shifting its elements. The result is called c.
2) The DFT of c is evaluated and the result is stored in the vector C.
3) The vector n that contains the frequency indices that corresponds to the passband of C is set up. We also define the vector m which is obtained by a random shuffling of the elements of n. 4) Define the phase vector e = L(C(n)) + L(C(m)). 5) Construct the spreading gain vector r as the key from e according to the equation r = ej8. Note that by taking L(C(n)), we effectively extract some information related to the channel impulse response. By adding the phase of the frequency response with a randomly shuffled version of the same signal, the elements within e are decor related. Another option would be to only extract the phase response of the frequency tones at a spacing equal to the channel coherence bandwidth rather than adding/subtracting with a randomly shuffled version of the same signal. This also would ensure an element-wise de-correlation of e, however at a cost of significant delay in the construction of the key.
Following the above procedure, as one would expect, thanks to channel reciprocity, the keys extracted by Alice and Bob, r A and rB, respectively, will be very similar. We quantita tively measure this similarity using the correlation coefficient PAB, defined as (8) For most of our measurements, PAB is 0.95 or greater. This clearly is a positive observation showing that the reciprocity works well, assuring a desirable keys setup at Alice and Bob. Unfortunately, Eve also shows relatively high correlation (see Figure 3 ) due in part to time-aligning the maximum value of the estimated channel response. This aligns Alice, Bob, and Eve's strongest path to the middle and since this path has the most effect on the phasors of the channel response (i.e., L(C(n»), it also causes there to be high correlation between Eve's and Alice's keys. Moreover, our experiment was set up so that Eve is directly in between Alice and Bob's nodes -a scenario which is advantageous for Eve. Considering these issues, we propose the use of SPC to remove the most significant path of each channel measurement. This next step, ideally, maintains the reciprocity between Alice and Bob's channel measurements while also removes the portion of the channel response that contributes to the highest amount of similarity between the adversary and legitimate parties.
C. Strongest Path Cancellation
If we assume that the estimated channel impulse response, c, is time-invariant over the time interval of channel probe, then its time-aligned and continuous-time version is (9) where ai, ¢i, and Ti are the magnitude, phase, and delay of the channel paths, and p(t) is the convolution of the transmitter and receiver filters.
To remove the strongest path, we solve the minimization problem Subsequently, the channel impulse response after removal of the strongest path is obtained as c(t) = c(t) -gmaxp (t -Tmax). (11) The key generation discussed in this section and the subse quent secure communication is summarized in Fig. l. 
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume Eve is a computationally unbounded passive eavesdropper that estimates the channel between herself and the legitimate parties. Eve performs key generation in the exact same way that Alice and Bob do and she knows the shuffling sequence m. No restriction is placed on the location of Eve with respect to Alice or Bob. Eve does not transmit channel probes and our current security solution does not authenticate the nodes. However, it should be noted that the secure communication step does have interesting potential for authentication in that the legitimate parties can use their spreading gains as a means for authentication, though this is outside the scope of this paper. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, experimentation results are presented to confirm satisfactory operation of the proposed key generation in practice. For the scope of this paper, we consider the generation of the key from reciprocal channels and leave the experimentation of the secure communication stage for future research.
A. Experimental Setup
We validate our methods with a transmitter that uses a National Instruments (NI) PXI-S441 Arbitrary Waveform Generator and a NI PXI-S61O Upconverter. The waveform generator is used to generate s[n mod M] defined in (12) . The beacon is interpolated by a factor L = 5 and transmitted at a sample rate of is = 100 MHz to the NI PXI-S61O which modulates the signal to a carrier frequency of 1.75 GHz. The rate of transmission of symbols s[n] is 20 MHz.
The receiver used in our experiments consists of a NI PXI S600 Downconverter module and aNI PXI-SI42 Digitizer. The Downcoverter demodulates the transmitted signal to baseband and is equipped with a 20 MHz low pass filter. The demodu lated signal is sampled at a rate of 100 MHz with the digitizer. The digitizer obtains the baseband response of the transmitted beacon for both the in-phase and quadrature-phase channels. Both the reciever and transmitter are connected to a circulator (Model No. CS-0.900) which is fed to an RF amplifier (Model No. CRBAMP-100-6000) and then to a single antenna.
All three parties in our experiment (Alice, Bob, and Eve) use identical transceiver setups and Eve's transmitter is turned off. We use time-division duplexing (TDD) for channel probing. Our experimentation was conducted in a hallway setting, with 12 position configurations for Alice, Bob, and Eve as indicated in Figure 2 . For each position configuration we perform 100 channel measurements over an extended period of time to capture some variations of the channels. In this experimental setup, all channels between Alice, Bob, and Eve have a strong line-of-sight path and as a result the generated key at Eve may be very similar to those of Alice and Bob.
In each experiment, a person was moving at an approxi mately 1 mls in a random fashion in the hallway between Alice and Bob. This gives a Doppler frequency of approximately 
Bob's channel and vice versa -was approximately 90 ms. This is equivalent to a channel probe rate of rv 11.11 Hz.
This probe rate, along with the Doppler frequency that was mentioned above introduces some reciprocity mismatch in the measurements. The reciprocity mismatch here introduces differences between Alice and Bob's keys. This is meant to showcase that the fault-tolerant nature of the keys can handle some mismatch.
We program the transmitter to use the Zadoff-Chu polyphase code defined in [21] [22] as
This signal has a special property where it is orthogonal to its circular shifts. With this special property, the estimation of the channel becomes trivial. The beacon is M periodic, where M is chosen to be SO and 20 periods of the beacon are used. s[n mod M] is interpolated by a factor of L = 5 using a square-root-raise-cosine-filter with a roll off factor of 1/2. The beacon signal is converted to analog, modulated and transmitted over carrier frequency Ie = 1.75 GHz. The duration of each beacon is 50fJs, and the channel probing procedure is repeated every SOO ms. In this way, we set up the experiment as a block fading model. That is, for the 50 fJS over which the block of beacons is sent for channel estimation, the channel is assumed to be a constant, and changes to a different one in the next probe period.
To validate the effectiveness of our key generation algo rithm, we use the correlation coefficient described in (8) . A good way to visualize the 1200 sets of channel measurements is to use the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the correlation coefficient of the key generated by Alice, Bob, and Eve. For instance the CDF of Alice and Bob is defined as FAB(X) = P(PAB > x ) , where PC) denotes probability of.
We use the 1200 channel estimates that we have obtained from the 12 experiments and use 1000 random choices of m to generate a total of 1.2 million pairs of keys. For all of these keys, we evaluate the cross correlations of the generated keys between node-pairs (A,B) and (A,E). Figure 3 presents the CDFs of PAB and PAE with and without SPC. Also, for reference, we have presented PAR which describes the cross correlation between between Alice's key and a random vector with independent identically distributed elements. This is an ideal situation where we assume Eve's channel is completely independent of those of Alice and Bob.
There are a few points to take from Figure 3. 1) It can easily be seen that SPC significantly decorrelates the keys generated by Alice and Eve. In fact, the average value of P AE for all keys before SPC is 0.S24 and after SPC is 0.OS6.
Additionally, the trend of the CDF in Figure 3 has shifted in a manner favorable to Spc. Specifically, the variance of P AE has decreased after SPC. This means that not only does the expected value of P AE decrease, but that correlation factors around the mean occur more often after SPC than before SPC. 2) In Figure 3 we see a slight decorrelation between (A, B) after applying SPC. This is partly due to the fact that by removing the strongest path of the channel estimate, the signal-to-noise ratio of the channel estimate is also decreased along with the correlation between Alice and Bob's keys. Additionally, one problem with the SPC method is that the temporal location of the strongest path T max sometimes differs between Alice and Bob due to non-reciprocities. This occurs particularly when multiple paths in c have identical channel gains ai. This is an ongoing rsearch topic that we hope to solve in the future. However, despite the tradeoffs, we still see that the decorrelation effect is considerably stronger on (A, E) than on the (A, B) node-pair.
3) It is seen that when comparing P AE after SPC to PAR, the decorrelation effect after applying SPC is approaching the result where Alice and Eve's channels are assumed independent from one another. Another interesting set of results are presented in Figure 4 .
Here, fe) denotes the probability distribution function (PDF), and 8 and 8 are the extracted angles (for the keys) before and after applying SPC, respectively. As observed f(8), approaches a uniform distribution over the interval [ -7f, 7f l, while f(8) is very far from a uniform distribution. The peaks in f (8) around 0, 7f and 27f relate to the fact that the largest path has been shifted to the middle of the channel impulse response vector.
VI. SECURITY LEVEL
The FB-MC-SS system that was developed in [15] gives us a processing gain of P = 10 IOg l O (2N) dB. This means, with a reasonable choice of N, the receiver will have a large processing gain and, accordingly, cOlmnunication can be established at a sub-noise level. Under this condition, since the adversary does not have access to the spreading gain that is used by the legitimate parties, a simple despreader may not be able to detect the data communicated between them. Nevertheless, when a sufficiently long data sequence uses the same key/spreading gain, a more sophisticated adversary can use a blind method to identify the spreading gain vector and subsequently use that to detect the communicated data. The problem will be worse and the adversary may be able to detect even short data burst, if SNR at adversary is high. To avoid this problem, [10]- [14] have assumed a model wherein a symbol is sent once every channel decorrelation period. We may apply the same assumption here and then each transmitted symbol would contain its own key uncorrelated from the next symbol's key, thereby applying a one-time pad solution to the secure transmission system. However, this solution decreases the throughput and more so if the channel is slowing varying. Another solution that may be applied is to follow [13] and add an artificial noise to the transmit information. The artificial noise is selected to be within the null space of the signal/information space, hence, it will be separable by a legitimate receiver who is aware of the space of the transmit information, but not by the adversary. The method was first proposed in [13] in the context of MIMO communications. However, its adoption to spread spectrum systems, in general, and to FB-MC-SS, in particular, is straightforward. In FB MC-SS, the signal space is determined by the spreading gain vector. Any vector orthogonal to the spreading gain vector belongs to its null space and, thus, is removed at the receiver when despeader is applied to recover the data symbols. A total of N -1 artificial noise vectors can be generated and therefore this many symbols can be communicated securely before one needs to update the key.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed and studied the secret key-enabled spread spectrum system that allows for the potential of stealthed secure communication. By using spread-spectrum technology, the generated key can be fault-tolerant, thereby allowing for the key to be generated in a very short period of time. By using filter-bank multi-carrier spread spectrum, the proposed system can maintain reliable communications in the harshest of environments.
This paper showed the effectiveness of the key generation aspect in particular. The key that is generated exhibits nice characteristics. We showed through experimentation in a line of-sight scenario, that though the adversary does not share reciprocity with legitimate parties, a significant amount of the adversary's keys highly correlated with the legitimate parties. After applying strongest path cancellation, an impor tant contribution of this paper, the adversary's generated key becomes significantly decorrelated with respect to those of the legitimate parties', thereby proving the effectiveness of the method.
